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†
Abstract: Physics takes for granted that interacting physical systems with
no common history are independent, before their interaction. This principle is
time-asymmetric, for no such restriction applies to systems with no common
future, after an interaction. The time-asymmetry is normally attributed to
boundary conditions. I argue that there are two distinct independence principles
of this kind at work in contemporary physics, one of which cannot be attributed
to boundary conditions, and therefore conflicts with the assumed T (or CPT)
symmetry of microphysics. I note that this may have interesting ramifications
in quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
Consider a photon, passing through a polariser. According to the standard
model of quantum mechanics, the state of the photon after the interaction re-
flects the orientation of the polariser. Not so before the interaction, of course:
in quantum mechanics, as elsewhere in physics, we don’t expect preinteractive
correlations.
Writers who notice this time asymmetry—postinteractive correlations, but
no preinteractive correlations—sometimes see it as an objection to the stan-
dard model of quantum mechanics. To most, however, it seems hardly worthy
of notice. True, the asymmetry may be a little puzzling, but its individual
components—that interactions may establish correlations, and that there are
no preinteractive correlations—seem plausible enough. If we were to try for
symmetry, which should we give up? Besides, the principle that there are no
preinteractive correlations plays an important role elsewhere in the physics of
time-asymmetry, where there is a well-established view to the effect that it is
not in conflict with the T-symmetry of underlying physical laws. Thus there
seems to be a precedent for the asymmetry we find in quantum mechanics, and
no reason, on reflection, to doubt our initial intuitions.
I think the calm is illusory, however, and my aim here is to reveal the troubled
waters beneath these rather slippery intuitions. I shall argue that the time
asymmetry embodied by the standard model is quite distinct from its supposed
analog elsewhere in physics, and cannot be reconciled with the T-symmetry
of the laws of physics in the same way. Given T-symmetry, I contend, pre-
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and postinteractive correlations should be on the same footing in microphysics.
Any reason for objecting to preinteractive correlations is a reason for objecting
to postinteractive correlations, and any reason for postulating postinteractive
correlations is a reason for postulating preinteractive correlations.
I emphasise that for the bulk of the paper, the link with quantum mechanics
is indirect. The standard model provides vivid examples of the intuitions I want
to examine, but my interest is in the intuitions themselves, not in the quantum
mechanical examples. However, I close with a comment on the significance of
my argument for the puzzles of quantum mechanics. Briefly, its effect seems
to be to undermine a crucial presupposition of the standard arguments that
quantum mechanics cannot be interpreted in more-or-less classical terms.
2 Two kinds of preinteractive independence
The principle that there are no preinteractive correlations has famous connec-
tions with the most striking time-asymmetry in physics, that of the second
law of thermodynamics. The connections emerge at two levels. First, Boltz-
mann’s H-Theorem derives its time-asymmetry from an assumption concerning
the preinteractive independence of interacting microsystems. (This assumption
needs to be time-asymmetric, of course, since otherwise the theorem would apply
equally in either temporal direction.)
At a more intuitive level, familiar low-entropy systems are associated with
striking postinteractive correlations. To make this point vivid, think of the
astounding preinteractive correlations we observe if we view ordinary processes
in reverse. Think of the tiny droplets of champagne, forming a pressurised
column and rushing into a bottle, narrowly escaping the incoming cork. Or think
of the countless (genuine!) fragments of the True Cross, making their precisely
choreographed journeys to Jerusalem. Astounding as these feats seem, they are
nothing but the mundane events of ordinary life, viewed from an unfamiliar
angle. Correlations of this kind are ubiquitous in one temporal sense—when
they occur after some central event, from our usual perspective—but unknown
and incredible in the other temporal sense.
In the macroscopic world of ordinary experience, then, the presence of postin-
teractive correlations and the absence of preinteractive correlations is closely
associated with the thermodynamic asymmetry. It is an old puzzle as to where
this asymmetry comes from, and especially as to how it is to be reconciled with
the apparent T-symmetry of the underlying laws of physics. The orthodox view
is that the asymmetry of thermodynamics is a matter of boundary conditions:
factlike rather than lawlike, as physicists often say. The contemporary version
of this view traces the low-entropy history of familiar physical systems to the
condition of the early universe. True, many hope that this early condition will
itself be explicable as a natural consequence of cosmological laws, in which case
the resulting asymmetry is not strictly factlike. Nevertheless, the success of
this program would preserve the intuitive distinction between the symmetry of
local dynamical laws, and the asymmetry of the boundary conditions supplied
2
to these symmetric laws in typical real systems.
It seems to be assumed that the kind of asymmetry exemplified by photons
and polarisers can be accommodated within this general picture, but I want to
show that this is not so. If there is an asymmetry in microphysics of this kind,
it cannot be accorded the status of a (locally) factlike product of boundary
conditions. This is because, unlike in the thermodynamic case, there is no
observational evidence for the required asymmetry in boundary conditions. On
the contrary, our sole grounds for thinking that the boundary conditions are
asymmetric in the relevant sense is that we already take for granted the principle
that there are post- but not preinteractive correlations of the relevant kind. In
effect, then, this principle operates in a lawlike manner, in conflict with the
assumed T-symmetry of (local) dynamical laws.
The first step is to show that the kind of postinteractive correlation displayed
by the photon is quite distinct from that associated with low-entropy systems,
such as the champagne bottle. With a little thought, this distinction is easy
to draw. For one thing, the correlations associated with low-entropy systems
are essentially “communal”, in the sense that they involve correlations among
the behaviour of very large numbers of individual systems. But the photon
correlations are individualistic, in the sense that they involve the simplest kinds
of interactions between one entity and another.
Second, the photon case is not dependent on the thermodynamic history of
the system comprising the photon and the polariser, or any larger system of
which it might form a part. Imagine a sealed black box containing a rotating
polariser, and suppose that the thermal radiation inside the box has always
been in equilibrium with the walls. We still expect the photons comprising this
radiation to establish the usual postinteractive correlations with the orientation
of the polariser, whenever they happen to pass through it. The presence of
these postinteractive correlations does not require that entropy was lower in the
past. By symmetry, then, the absence of matching preinteractive correlations
cannot be deduced—at any rate, not directly—from the fact that entropy does
not decrease toward the future: a world in which photons were correlated with
polarisers before they interacted would not necessarily be a world in which the
second law of thermodynamics did not hold.
It will be helpful to have labels for the two kinds of preinteractive indepen-
dence just distinguished. I’ll call the principle that there are no entropy-reducing
correlations “H-Independence”, in light of its role in the H-Theorem, and the
principle that there are no preinteractive correlations between individual micro-
systems “micro-independence” (“µIndependence”, for short).
3 Initial randomness?
I have argued that observational evidence for H-Independence need not be obser-
vational evidence for µIndependence—at any rate, not directly. There might be
an indirect argument in the offing, however. Perhaps the second law supports
some hypothesis about the initial conditions of the universe, an independent
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consequence of which is that photons are not correlated with polarisers before
they interact. For example, it is often suggested that the explanation for the
second law lies in the fact that the initial microstate of the universe is as random
as it can be, given its low-entropy macrostate. Wouldn’t this hypothesis also
explain why photons are not correlated with future polarisers?
In my view this hypothesis is independently unsatisfactory. In particular,
it is doubtful whether the required boundary condition can be specified in a
nonvacuous way—i.e., other than as the condition that the initial state of the
universe is such that the second law holds. (See Price 1996, 42.) General defects
to one side, however, the hypothesis turns out to be irrelevant to the issue at
hand. In effect, the suggestion is that if systems comprising photons and po-
larisers are allowed a free choice of the available initial microstates, there can be
no general correlation between the states of incoming photon-polariser pairs. If
this were true, what would it mean for the ordinary postinteractive correlations?
Do these require that the final conditions be less than completely random? Not
if we understand the choice to be made from those situations permitted by the
relevant physical laws—in other words, from the phase space of the system in
question. Of course, if we think of nature making its choice from some larger set
of possibilities, then the laws themselves constitute restrictions on the available
options. Only choices in accordance with the laws are allowed. But a random
choice from phase space (or, equivalently, from the set of trajectories of a deter-
ministic system) is by definition a choice from among (all and only) the options
allowed by the laws.
Thus lawlike postinteractive correlations are not incompatible with random-
ness of final conditions. By symmetry, matching preinteractive correlations
would not require non-random initial conditions. Hence µIndependence receives
no support from the hypothesis that initial randomness explains the thermody-
namic asymmetry.
4 Colliding beams?
There is another argument in the literature to the effect that there is indirect
observational evidence for µIndependence. It turns on the idea that by pos-
tulating µIndependence, we are able to explain certain observable phenomena.
I think this argument is due originally to O. Penrose and R. Percival (1962),
who formulate a principle of preinteractive independence they call the Law of
Conditional Independence. As their terminology indicates, Penrose and Perci-
val take this to be a lawlike principle. In favour of this view, they argue that
the principle is able to explain a variety of otherwise inexplicable irreversible
processes.
The claim that Conditional Independence is lawlike has not been widely
accepted, but it does seem a common view in physics that Penrose and Perci-
val’s examples provide indirect observational evidence for preinteractive inde-
pendence. A typical example concerns the scattering which occurs when two
tightly organised beams of particles are allowed to intersect. The argument is
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that this scattering is explicable if we assume that there are no prior correlations
between colliding pairs of particles (one from each beam)—and hence that the
scattering pattern reveals the underlying independence of the motions of the
incoming particles.
In fact, however, µIndependence is neither necessary nor sufficient here.
The explanation rests entirely on the absence of entropy-reducing correlations
between the incoming beams—i.e. on H-Independence—not on µIndependence
at the level of individual particle pairs. In other words, the asymmetry involved
in these cases is nothing more than the familiar thermodynamic asymmetry,
from which—as we have seen—µIndependence is supposed to be distinct.
I’ll offer short and long arguments for this conclusion. The short argument
simply appeals to cases in which it seems intuitively clear that there is no mi-
croscopic asymmetry—Newtonian particles, for example. In these cases there
seems to be nothing to sustain any asymmetry at the level of individual inter-
actions, and yet we still expect colliding beams to scatter. This suggests that
the scattering is associated with the lack of some global correlation, not with
anything true of individual particle pairs.
The longer argument goes like this. We suppose that there is a micro-
scopic asymmetry of µIndependence, distinct from the correlations associated
with the thermodynamic asymmetry, and yet compatible with the T-symmetry
of the relevant dynamical laws. We then construct a temporal inverse of the
scattering beam experiment, and show that it displays (reverse) scattering, de-
spite the assumed absence of the postinteractive analog of µIndependence. By
symmetry, this shows that µIndependence is not necessary to explain the scat-
tering observed in the usual case. Finally, a variant of this argument shows that
µIndependence is also insufficient for the scattering observed in the usual case.
If µIndependence were necessary for scattering, in other words, then scat-
tering would not occur if the experiment were run in reverse. It is difficult to
replicate the experiment in reverse, for we don’t have direct control of final con-
ditions. But we can do it by selecting the small number of cases which do satisfy
the desired final conditions from a larger sample. We consider a large system
of interacting particles of the kind concerned, and consider only those pairs of
particles which emerge on two tightly constrained trajectories (one particle on
each), having perhaps interacted in a specified region at the intersection of these
two trajectories (though not with any particle which does not itself emerge on
one of these trajectories). We then consider the distribution of initial trajecto-
ries, before interaction, for these particles. What is the most likely distribution?
If the dynamical laws are T-symmetric, then it must be simply the distribution
which mirrors the predicted scattering in the usual case.
The argument can be made more explicit by describing a symmetric arrange-
ment, subsets of which duplicate both versions of the experiment. Consider a
spherical shell, divided by a vertical plane. On the inner face of the left hemi-
sphere is an arrangement of particle emitters, each of which produces particles of
random speed and timing, directed towards the centre of the sphere. In the right
hemisphere is a matching array of particle detectors. Dynamical T-symmetry
implies that if the choice of initial conditions is random, the global history of
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the device is also time-symmetric: any particular pair of particle trajectories is
equally likely to occur in its mirror-image form, with the position of emission
and absorption reversed.
We can replicate the original collimated beam experiment by choosing the
subset of the global history of the device containing particles emitted from two
chosen small regions on the left side. Similarly, we can replicate the reverse
collimated beam experiment by choosing the subset of the history of the entire
device containing particles absorbed at two chosen small regions on the right
side. In the latter case, the particles concerned will in general have been emitted
from many different places on the left side. This follows from the fact that
the initial conditions are a random as possible, compatible with the chosen
final conditions. Thus we have scattering in the initial conditions, despite the
assumed lack of postinteractive µIndependence between interacting particles.
Thus if there were postinteractive correlations of the kind denied to the
preinteractive case by µIndependence, they would not stand in the way of scat-
tering in the reverse experiment—scattering in that case is guaranteed by the
assumption that the initial conditions are as random as possible, given the fi-
nal constraints. By symmetry, however, this implies that µIndependence is not
necessary to produce scattering in the normal case. We would have scattering
without µIndependence, provided that the choice of trajectories is as random
as possible, given the initial constraints. (Don’t suggest that this is the same
thing as µIndependence. If that were true, µIndependence would not fail in the
postinteractive case, and there not be the assumed microscopic asymmetry.)
A third version of the experiment can be used to show that µIndependence is
not sufficient to explain what happens in the normal case. Assume µIndepend-
ence again, and consider the subset of the first experiment in which we have
collimation on the right, as well as the left—in other words, in which we impose
a final condition, as well as an initial condition. In this case, we have no scat-
tering, despite µIndependence. Again, it is no use saying that the imposition
of the final condition amounts to a denial of µIndependence: if that were true,
the asymmetry of µIndependence in the normal case would amount to nothing
more than the presence of a low-entropy initial condition, in conflict with the
supposition that µIndependence differs from H-Independence.
In other words, µIndependence is both insufficient and unnecessary to ex-
plain the phenomena observed in these scattering experiments. The differences
between the various versions of the experiment are fully explained by the dif-
ferent choices of initial and final boundary conditions. The asymmetry of the
original case stems from the fact that we have a low-entropy initial condition
(consisting in the fact that the beam are initially collimated) but no correspond-
ing final condition. The issue as to why this is the case that occurs in nature
is a sub-issue of that of the origins of the thermodynamic asymmetry in gen-
eral. It has nothing to do with any further asymmetry of kind described by
µIndependence.
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5 What to do about µIndependence
It seems that as it currently operates in physics, then, µIndependence is not an
a posteriori principle derived from observation, but a lawlike principle in its own
right. We don’t observe that the incoming photon is not correlated with polariser
through which it is about to pass. Rather, we rely on a tacit meta-law that laws
enforcing preinteractive correlations would be unacceptable. In a sense, then,
we do take it for granted that there is an asymmetry in the boundary condi-
tions of the kind required by µIndependence: not because we have empirical
evidence for such an asymmetry, however, but only because we have framed the
laws in the light of µIndependence. We allow dynamical principles producing
postinteractive correlations, while disallowing their preinteractive twins.
Conceding that µIndependence is lawlike does not improve its prospects, of
course; it simply ’fesses-up to the principle’s current role in microphysics. In
one important sense it makes its prospects very much worse, for as a lawlike
principle, µIndependence conflicts with T-symmetry. We might be justified in
countenancing such a conflict if there were strong empirical evidence for a time-
asymmetric law, but the supposed evidence for µIndependence turns out to rely
on a different asymmetry altogether.
What are the options at this point? First, we might look for other ways of
defending µIndependence. Unless this evidence is a posteriori, however, its effect
will be simply to deepen the puzzle about the T-asymmetry of microphysics.
Moreover, although there is undoubtedly more to be said about the intuitive
plausibility of µIndependence, I suspect that the effect of further investigation
is to explain but not to justify our intuitions. For example, the intuitive ap-
peal of µIndependence may rest in part on a feature of human experience, the
fact that in practice our knowledge of things in the physical world is always
postinteractive, not preinteractive. The exact explanation of this asymmetry
is rather tricky. It seems to depend in part on our own time-asymmetry as
structures in spacetime, and in part on broader environmental aspects of the
general thermodynamic asymmetry. Whatever its exact provenance, however,
it seems to provide no valid grounds for extending the intuitions concerned to
microphysics.
Similarly, as I’ve argued elsewhere (1996, 181–4), some apparent postinter-
active dependencies turn out to be associated with a temporal asymmetry in
counterfactual reasoning—roughly, the fact that we “hold fixed” the past, when
considering the consequences of counterfactual conditions. Given a conventional
account of this aspect of counterfactual reasoning, the asymmetries concerned
are thus demystified, in the sense that they are shown to require no independent
asymmetry in the physical systems concerned. Again, some of the intuitive ap-
peal of µIndependence is thereby accounted for, but in a way which does nothing
to clarify the puzzle of the photon case.
Another response to the puzzle would be to try to restore T-symmetry in
microphysics by excising postinteractive correlations, rather than by admitting
preinteractive correlations. The standard model of quantum mechanics might
be first in line, for example. The surgery required is likely to be rather radical,
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however. Without postinteractive correlation of some sort, how is it possible
for a measuring device to record information about an object system? That
aside, the move seems misguided. It does nothing to justify µIndependence,
and restores symmetry by creating two puzzles where previously we had one.
In my view, the only option which really faces up to the problem is that of
admitting that our intuitions might be wrong, and that µIndependence might
indeed fail in microphysics. I want to finish with a few remarks on the possible
relevance of this option in quantum mechanics. In order to clarify the force of
these remarks, I emphasise again that up to this point, my references to quantum
mechanics have been somewhat inessential. The standard model of quantum
mechanics provides the most vivid examples of an asymmetry we find it easy
to take for granted in microphysics, but the case against this asymmetry has
been essentially classical. The main point is that despite common opinion to the
contrary, it is not associated with the classical asymmetry of thermodynamics.
In effect, then, the case against µIndependence constitutes a prior constraint on
the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
6 µIndependence and quantum mechanics
Surprisingly, µIndependence turns out to be a fundamental assumption of the
main arguments taken to show that the quantum world is puzzlingly nonclassi-
cal. In particular, Bell’s Theorem depends on the assumption that the state of
an object system is independent of the setting of a measurement device, prior
to their interaction. Thanks to µIndependence, this independence assumption
has often seemed so uncontentious as to pass without comment. Bell himself
considered relaxing it, but even he tended to think about this possibility in a
way which doesn’t conflict with µIndependence. (His suggestion, which he called
“superdeterminism”, was that the correlation might established by an additional
common cause in the past, not simply in virtue of the existing interaction in
the future; see Bell et. al., 1985.)
More recent arguments for nonlocality (the GHZ cases; see e.g., Clifton, Pag-
onis and Pitowsky 1992) also depend on this independence assumption. Without
µIndependence, then, there seems to be no firm reason to think that quantum
mechanics commits us to nonlocality. Many commentators have noted that in
principle, the Bell correlations are easily explicable if hidden common causes
may lie in the future, as well as in the past. My point is that if µIndependence
is rejected on classical grounds, this is precisely what we should expect.
There is a similar impact on the no hidden variable theorems (e.g. Kochen
and Specker 1967), which argue that no system of pre-existing properties could
reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, at least in certain cases.
µIndependence serves to justify the assumption that a single hidden state must
reproduce the quantum predictions for any possible next measurement. If the
hidden state is allowed to vary with the nature of the measurement, the prob-
lem is relatively trivial. (In Bohm’s 1952 hidden variable theory, the trick is
to allow measurement to have an instantaneous effect on the hidden variables;
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again, however, µIndependence underpins the assumption that the effect must
be instantaneous, rather than advanced.) Abandoning µIndependence might
thus resuscitate the hidden variable approach, and with it an old solution to the
measurement problem: If collapse corresponds merely to a change in informa-
tion, it is unproblematic.
Thus µIndependence plays a crucial role in the main arguments taken to show
that quantum mechanics has puzzling nonclassical consequences. Imagine how
things would have looked if physics had considered abandoning µIndependence
on symmetry grounds, before the development of quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanics would then have seemed to provide an additional argument against
µIndependence, by reductio: given quantum mechanics, µIndependence implies
such absurdities such as nonlocality and the measurement problem. Against
this background, then, experimental confirmation of the Bell correlations would
have seemed to provide empirical data for which the best explanation is that
µIndependence does fail, as already predicted on symmetry grounds.
Of course, from a contemporary standpoint it is difficult to see things in
these terms. Leaving aside our intuitive commitment to µIndependence, the
quantum puzzles have lost much of their capacity to shock—familiarity has
bred a measure of contentment in physics, and the imagined reductio has lost
its absurdum. Regaining a classical perspective would not be an easy step, or one
to be attempted lightly, but it does seem worth entertaining. By abandoning a
habit of thought which already seems to conflict with well-established principles
of symmetry, we might free quantum mechanics of consequences which once
seemed intolerable in physics, and might do so again.
9
7 References
Bell, J., Clauser, J., Horne, M. and Shimony, A. (1985), “An Exchange
on Local Beables”, Dialectica 39: 86-110.
Bohm, D. (1952), “A Suggested Interpretation of Quantum Theory in Terms
of Hidden Variables”, Physical Review 85: 166–193.
Clifton, R., Pagonis, C. and Pitowsky, I. (1992), “Relativity, Quantum
Mechanics and EPR”, in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruhlik, (eds.), PSA 1992,
Volume 1, Chicago: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 114-28.
Kochen, S. and Specker, E. P. (1967), “The Problem of Hidden Variables
in Quantum Mechanics”, Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 17: 59–87 .
Penrose, O. and Percival, I. C. (1962), “The Direction of Time”, Proceed-
ings of the Physical Society 79: 605–616.
Price, H. (1996), Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point, New York: Oxford
University Press.
10
